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Abstract This paper addresses the issue of the impact of fund ﬂows on
real investment. In the classical world, fund ﬂows affect
investment by changing the cost of funds or through the
weighted average cost of capital. In a less perfect world, fund
ﬂows can directly alter investment though a rationing
mechanism, where even presumably proﬁtable investment is
choked off.
This paper examines the commercial mortgage market over the
last quarter century. The ﬁndings indicate an effect of constrained
ﬂows on investment in the early 1990s, but an independent
impact of higher ﬂows to the commercial mortgage market in
the middle 1980s is not found.
Periodically concerns arise that commercial real estate activity is being choked
off by a shortage of ﬁnancial capital (Mejia, 1999). At other times, too much
ﬁnancial capital is alleged to cause overbuilding (Hendershott and Kane, 1992;
and Giliberto, 1992). This paper analyzes the commercial mortgage market over
the last quarter century to determine periods of credit crunches or credit gluts.
Commercial real estate is one of many real investments in the economy. And this
investment is undertaken by a number of different types of business entities that
are funded by a wide range of ﬁnancial institutions, who themselves obtain
funding from savers. Thus, understanding the funding of commercial real estate
investment requires examination of the ﬁnancial behaviors of many economic
sectors. Presenting a broad framework for understanding the interactions of these
behaviors and the funding of commercial real estate investment is the place to
start. The U.S. ﬂow of funds accounts constitutes the framework.
Under what circumstances do security ﬂows determine (affect) the volume of
commercial real estate investment? In general, the supply of funds can have an
independent impact on commercial real estate investment only when
‘‘disturbances’’ emanate from the ﬁnancial system or within the funds ﬂows
matrix. Such disturbances begin by affecting the distribution of saving and the418  Donohue and Hendershott
portfolio decisions of ﬁnancial institutions and then spill over onto real investment
decisions. The different ﬁnancial intermediaries [e.g., banks, thrifts, real estate
investment trusts (REITs), insurance companies, etc.] have different proclivities to
invest in commercial real estate either directly or indirectly; thus shocks that alter
the distribution of funds among the intermediaries or the allocation of investments
of the intermediaries will affect the ﬁnancing of real estate unless the total supply
of funds is completely elastic. Thus, the paper considers factors affecting the
demands for commercial real estate equity and debt instruments.
The major debt vehicle for ﬁnancing commercial real estate is commercial
mortgages. Clayton (2003) suggests that increases in net commercial mortgage
issues lead to greater commercial property returns (as measured by the NCREIF
Commercial Property Index), which presumably triggers greater commercial real
estate investment. Thus, the paper analyzes sectoral issues and purchases of
commercial mortgages over the last quarter century. The paper concludes with a
brief summary and some thoughts on future work in this area.
 The Flow of Funds Matrix and Commercial Real Estate
Investment
The ﬂow of funds in an economy can be viewed as a pipe system with water
(saving) ﬂowing in one end and out the other (as nonﬁnancial investment). Exhibit
1 pictures such a system, where the left inﬂow represents saving in the economy
and the right outﬂow represents investment in real assets (nonﬁnancial capital).
Because changes in inventories are deﬁned as investment/disinvestment, the
saving and investment ﬂows are equal; an unanticipated increase/decrease in
saving (decrease/increase in consumption) increases/decreases inventories
equally.
Both investment and saving consist of a number of component parts. Total saving
is portioned into household (or personal), business and government plus foreign
(henceforth called ‘‘other’’). In addition, three kinds of nonﬁnancial investment—
household (owner-occupied housing and consumer durables), commercial real
estate and other business (industrial plant and equipment and changes in
inventories) are considered. In some cases, saving ﬂows directly into nonﬁnancial
investment. For example, households can channel funds directly into houses, and
businesses can put retained earnings directly into plant and equipment (other
structures and other business, respectively).
But most saving ﬁrst ﬂows into primary securities (stocks and bonds, broadly
deﬁned) and secondary securities (debt of ﬁnancial intermediaries), and then is
moved into real or nonﬁnancial investments. For simplicity, Exhibit 1 contains a
single primary security market and only one ﬁnancial intermediary class. Thus,
saving ﬂows either directly into nonﬁnancial investment, into primary securities,
or to the ﬁnancial intermediary. Of course, funds going to the intermediary thenCommercial Real Estate Investment  419
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Exhibit 1 is a diagram of the ﬂow of funds, with the left side representing saving in the economy, the middle
representing instruments and intermediaries through which funds ﬂow, and the right side representing investment
in real assets.
ﬂow into either nonﬁnancial investment or primary securities. In the end, all the
saving channeled into primary securities or through the intermediary ﬁnances
nonﬁnancial investment.1
Just as saving equals investment, security purchases equal security issues. The
arrows in Exhibit 1 from Household, Business and Other to Primary Securities
and Financial Intermediaries are security purchases by the nonﬁnancial sectors.
Purchases of the intermediary claims are, of course, matched by issues of the
intermediaries. The primary security purchases are also matched by issues, in this
case those of the Household, Business, Other and Financial Intermediary sectors.
These issues are not shown in the exhibit.
The size of the fund that ﬂows into a particular investment is more often
determined by a pulling from the investment side than a pushing from saving. To
illustrate, the most important determinant of the ﬂow of funds into commercial
real estate is surely the demand for commercial space. Increased demands for
space will drive vacancy rates down and real rents and values up. As a result,
developers will build (Brainard and Tobin, 1968; and Gentry and Mayer, 2002),
and funds will be diverted from other uses (nonﬁnancial capital investments) to
ﬁnance the development. In terms of Exhibit 1, changed space demands magically
alter the composition of investment outlays on the left.420  Donohue and Hendershott
The composition of nonﬁnancial investment also depends on tax law and the
perceived risk of the different types of investment. A signiﬁcant input into the
user cost of capital is the weighted (debt and equity) average cost of ﬁnancing
nonﬁnancial investments (WACC). This is the after-tax risk-free interest rate plus
a risk premium. The higher the risk premium for a type of investment, the greater
the WACC and thus the user cost, and therefore the smaller the fraction of total
investment in this component. Put another way, the higher the risk premium for
an investment, the higher is its cap rate and the lower are valuations and thus
incentives to supply more of the component.
And taxes affect WACC of different types of investment differentially. For
example, the returns (cash ﬂow and capital gains) on owner-occupied housing
(and consumer durables) are not taxed and home mortgage interest is largely
deductible. As a result of this non-taxation, the user cost of capital (the annual
rental cost) is lower for owner-occupied housing than other nonﬁnancial
investments, thus getting more of the former and less of the latter, including
commercial real estate. A large literature exists on the resultant over-investment
in household capital relative to business or industrial capital (for early
contributions; see Hendershott, 1983, and Hendershott and Hu, 1983). Another
tax example is the extremely generous tax depreciation allowances that existed in
the early 1980s and the meager allowances that existed after the 1986 tax reform
act (Follain, Hendershott and Ling, 1987, 1992). As a result, the user cost for
commercial real estate and other ﬁxed business investment (but not inventories or
household real capital) was ﬁrst relatively low and then relatively high.
 Determinants of Commercial Mortgage Portfolio
Demands
Taxes can also affect the distribution of saving among ﬁnancial intermediaries.
For example, if household saving at banks directly lowered taxable income and
if the return on this saving were exempt from taxation (e.g., 401-type retirement
plans), saving in this form would certainly increase relative to saving through
other intermediaries or primary security markets. And if banks were more likely
than other intermediaries to invest in commercial real estate, the ﬂow of funds to
it would increase. More fundamentally, the 1960 decision to exempt REITs from
taxation at the ﬁrm level likely has affected both the distribution of saving and
the share of nonﬁnancial investment in commercial real estate.
Risk premia for different nonﬁnancial investments can presumably change in
fundamental ways over time as private markets develop or government regulation
becomes more or less restrictive. The securitization of ﬁrst residential and then
commercial mortgages, and the changes in risk-based capital requirements of
ﬁnancial institutions in the early 1990s are likely illustrations.
Premia might also change over the business cycle owing to changes in business
risks. For example, one might conjecture that the required equity risk premiumCommercial Real Estate Investment  421
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fell and rebounded in response to the boom and bust in the stock market since
1997, with offsetting shifts in the demand for real estate.
Different investor classes have different assessments of the risk premium for
commercial real estate or securities issued to ﬁnance it. For example, a fully
diversiﬁed investor will have a low risk premium because nonsystematic risk is
not an issue, while a nondiversiﬁed investor will charge a premium for
nonsystematic as well as systematic risk. Thus, the development of a diversiﬁed
REIT sector could lower the risk premium on commercial real estate, increasing
the ﬂow of saving to it.
If a speciﬁc ﬁnancial intermediary has a lower commercial real estate risk
premium and this intermediary receives more/fewer funds, investment in
commercial real estate will increase/decrease. Thus, the taxation/regulation of
ﬁnancial intermediaries, as well as of households supplying funds to
intermediaries, matters. If taxation/regulation of an intermediary is lowered/
loosened, then it will be able to attract a larger share of household saving. Again,
if the intermediary has a relatively low/high commercial real estate risk premium,
investment in commercial real estate will increase/decrease. As noted below, the
1982 expansion of thrift asset powers to allow investing in commercial mortgages
and the increase in ﬁnancial intermediary risk-based capital requirements for
whole loans or mortgages in 1993 were important regulatory changes for
commercial real estate.
Similarly, the efﬁciency of primary securities markets matters. If a primary
securities market becomes more liquid (bid–ask spreads shrink), then more funds
will ﬂow directly to this market and less to other primary security markets or
through intermediaries. And if the now more efﬁcient primary market favors/
disfavors commercial real estate, then investment in commercial real estate will
rise/fall.
To summarize, the relative ﬂow of funds to commercial real estate depends
importantly on taxes, regulation and risk. Taxation of nonﬁnancial investment
components, of household saving and of ﬁnancial intermediaries all matter.
Examples of important tax legislation in the last ﬁfty years include the 1960
exemption of REITs from taxation at the ﬁrm level, the incredibly generous and
then stingy tax depreciation allowances for structures in the 1980s and the general
expansion of tax exempt retirement savings vehicles for households. Examples of
potentially important changes in risk premia are harder to identify because these
premia are not observed.
Documenting the impact of these factors on commercial real estate investment is
a formidable task. The main difﬁculty is that other factors are likely far more
important. To illustrate, say that one wished to identify the impact of home
mortgage securitization on housing. One would effectively have to estimate what
the increase in the housing stock would have been in the absence of securitization
and then obtain the securitization impact by subtraction. This would entail422  Donohue and Hendershott
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Exhibit 2 plots annual net commercial mortgage issues in billions of dollars. Total net issues are reported, along
with three major classes of issuers. Data are drawn from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts.
accounting for demographic changes over time, as well as changes in real income,
in variables determining the user cost of capital (household marginal tax rates,
expected house price appreciation, etc.).
And what about the impact of the REIT tax-exemption status? One would need
estimates of the impact on the REIT industry’s share of savings and of how much
the increase in this share fuelled additional commercial real estate investment—
most of the increase likely just replaced investment that would otherwise have
been ﬁnanced by some other sector.
Contrast these analyses with determining the impact of changes in tax depreciation
allowances. Here all one needs to know is how the tax depreciation changes
affected the user cost of capital for investment and how investment responds to
such changes. This makes the point that the further the tax/regulatory intervention
is away from the end nonﬁnancial investment, the more difﬁcult it will be to
identify the impact because more other factors will have to be accounted for.
 Net Issues and Purchases of Commercial Mortgages
Exhibit 2 plots total commercial mortgage issues over the last quarter century, as
well as those of nonﬁnancial corporate business, noncorporate business and REITs.
Total issues equal the sum of those issued by these three sectors and nonproﬁt
organizations.2 As can be seen, total issues increased ﬁve-fold between the late
1970s and the late 1990s, about twice the increase in nominal GNP. However, the
real growth occurred entirely in the early 1980s; the recent $100 to $120 billionCommercial Real Estate Investment  423
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total annual issues are less in real terms than the $60 to $85 billion issues during
the 1983–1988 period.
Historically, the major issuer has been the noncorporate business sector, and that
sector fully accounted for the early tripling of the market. Corporate business
issues are the most cyclical, being negative during the recession periods of 1980,
1982 and 1991–1993 (but not 2000). Except for these declines and large issues
in the late 1980s, corporate issues have been in the $5 to $15 billion range until
recent years. REITs were a negligible factor in the market until the second half
of the 1990s.
The major questions here are the causes of the early 1980s surge in issues and,
especially, the subsequent cycle in this market. Have issues simply reﬂected
swings in the demand for real estate ﬁnancing or have changes in the supply of
funds sometimes driven the market? That is, have fund ﬂows altered commercial
real estate investment or have the ﬂows simply been pulled along by the
investment? To assist in this assessment, the annual average commercial mortgage
issues and purchases during the 1977–2002 period have been computed for two
to four year segments. These segments capture the major shifts in the market.
Purchases are given for commercial banks, saving institutions, life insurance
companies, asset-backed security issuers (ABSs) and all other. These data are
shown in Exhibit 3.
As can be seen, purchases of all the major investors (except ABSs) plummeted
in the early 1990s, although those of nonbank savings institutions (SAVs) fell ﬁrst.
SAV purchases were small ($4 billion per year) during the 1977–1988 period
except for a surge to $16 billion during 1983–1985. In contrast, SAVs liquidated
$15 period a year during the next six years. After purchasing $35 billion
commercial mortgages annually during the 1984–1990 period, commercial banks
bought none during the 1991–1994 period. Life insurance companies (LICs)
averaged annual purchases of $17 billion a year during the 1985–1990 period,
but liquidated $11 billion a year during the 1991–1994 period and another $5
billion annually during 1995–1996.3 The post–1994 data indicate that of these
three sectors, only commercial banks have come back into the market in a
signiﬁcant way. Rather, the LICs and SAVs have been replaced by ABSs and
greater bank purchases.
While examination of the security issues and purchases in the ﬂow of funds
accounts is certainly useful, and one obviously would not want to work in a
framework where these adding up constraints or identities did not hold, the data
have their limitations. In particular, if issues and purchases in a market increase,
did greater demand or supply of the security cause the increase? Similarly, if
investment in commercial real estate rises, what was the role played by real estate
ﬁnancing? Did easy ﬁnancing encourage the increased investment or did tight
ﬁnancing restrain it? Simply put, in order to infer causation, one generally needs

























Exhibit 3  Commercial Mortgage Issues and Purchases
1977–1979 1980–1982 1983–1985 1986–1988 1989–1990 1991–1994 1995–1996 1997–1998 1999–2002
Net Borrowing 21.6 32.2 68.0 71.8 26.0 26.1 21.2 76.2 110.2
Issues
Household sector 0.8 1.0 5.1 5.7 11.8 4.7 2.5 4.1 9.7
Nonﬁnancial corporate business 7.6 3.7 8.8 27.6 6.1 18.9 7.7 22.8 39.4
Nonfarm noncorporate business 13.2 34.8 54.0 38.2 7.8 14.2 11.5 36.0 58.1
REITs 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 2.4 4.4 13.3 2.9
Purchasers
Commercial Banking 8.6 9.8 25.2 39.9 30.4 1.0 17.6 29.4 62.0
Savings Institutions 3.9 2.8 16.1 5.2 16.1 13.8 0.6 0.1 7.1
Life Insurance Companies 7.4 7.5 11.4 20.0 13.8 11.3 4.8 1.8 6.6
ABS Issuers 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.6 3.3 6.3 8.4 34.9 36.0
Others 1.7 12.1 15.2 5.1 5.5 6.3 0.6 9.8 1.6
Note: Annual net commercial mortgage ﬂows in billions of dollars from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts.Commercial Real Estate Investment  425
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Exhibit 4 plots the annual spread of commercial mortgages over ten-year constant maturity Treasuries. The com-
mercial mortgage yield data are from ACLI and are based on annualized quarterly data.
(the interest rate) increases when the volume of issues is rising, the supply of
issues is likely leading the demand. On the other hand, if the price of funds
decreases, greater demand is likely inducing supply.
In the case of commercial mortgages, the relevant price is the spread between the
yield on commercial mortgages and the yield on comparable maturity Treasuries.
Exhibit 4 contains the annual spread over ten-year constant maturity Treasuries,
where the yield on commercial mortgages is from the ACLI.4 The spread was
highly volatile over the 1978–1990 period and averaged 1.35 percentage points.
The spread then jumped to 2.22 percentage points in 1991–1993, before falling
back to 1.59 during the 1994–1997 period. The spread again rose sharply,
averaging 2.14 during 1999–2002. It is interesting that the greatest spreads
occurred both when commercial mortgage issues were at their lowest (1991–1993)
and at their highest (1999–2002). This alone suggests that supply constraints
developed during the 1991–1993 period, whereas demand was pulling a
responsive supply in 1999–2002.
Issues
Exhibit 5 provides some aggregated data on sources and uses of funds by corporate
(top) and noncorporate (bottom) business for the nine sub-periods. The net

























Exhibit 5  Sources and Uses of Nonﬁnancial Businesses
1977–1979 1980–1982 1983–1985 1986–1988 1989–1990 1991–1994 1995–1996 1997–1998 1999–2002
Panel A: Nonfarm Nonﬁnancial Corporate
Total Internal Funds  IVA 188 247 350 392 425 498 648 722 767
Capital Expenditures 224 294 367 383 436 491 651 793 860
Net Acquisition of Financial Assets
Net trade credit 16 8 28 20 11 61 8 2 9 5
Net miscellaneous asset plus discrepancy 14 17 20 81 24 8 96 72 37
Other assets less taxes payable 10 24 46 16 8 44 36 32 64
Net Increase in Liabilities
Commercial mortgages 8 4 9 28 6 19 8 23 39
Corporate bonds 20 28 52 103 60 61 104 193 213
Other credit market instruments 51 72 98 73 80 10 94 134 16
Net new equity issues 20 48 97 94 5 53 146 79























































Exhibit 5  (continued)
Sources and Uses of Nonﬁnancial Businesses
1977–1979 1980–1982 1983–1985 1986–1988 1989–1990 1991–1994 1995–1996 1997–1998 1999–2002
Panel B: Nonﬁnancial Noncorporate
Gross Saving 32 48 60 76 90 97 108 122 144
Capital Expenditures 60 81 105 128 128 103 136 125 193
Net Acquisition of Financial Assets
Other assets less taxes payable 7 9 17 5 61 12 2 4 4 4 1
Net trade credit 2 0 2 4 1 3 1 6 3
Net miscellaneous assets 1 10 16 2 8 1 15 15 29
Net Increase in Liabilities
Commercial mortgages 13 35 54 38 8 14 12 36 58
Other credit market instruments 29 16 42 46 12 5 45 91 106
Proprietors’ net investment 4 18 47 22 6 40 9 60 42
ComMort/TotalCredit Market Instruments 0.31 0.69 0.56 0.45 0.40 0.74 0.20 0.28 0.35
CorComMort/NoncorComMort 0.57 (0.11) 0.16 0.72 0.78 1.33 0.67 0.63 0.68
Note: Annual ﬂows in billions of dollars from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts. The speciﬁc series underlying the stated sources and uses are
described in the Appendix. For corporations, the ratio is of net commercial mortgage issues to the sum of these issues and issues of corporate bonds. For
noncorporations, the ratio is of net commercial mortgage issues to total issues of credit market instruments. The ratio of corporate to noncorporate
commercial mortgage issues is also listed.428  Donohue and Hendershott
while the net increase in ﬁnancial liabilities is divided into commercial mortgages,
corporate bonds, other credit market instruments (CMI) and equity issues.5 Internal
funds (or gross saving) and capital expenditure increase monotonically over the
periods, while net ﬁnancial asset purchases and security issues exhibit some
volatility.6 The interest here is in commercial mortgage issues.
Beneath the corporate section of the table are listed the ratio of commercial
mortgage issues to the sum of commercial mortgage and corporate bond issues.
Beneath the noncorporate section are listed the ratio of commercial mortgage
issues to total issues of credit market instruments. Also listed is the ratio of
corporate to noncorporate commercial mortgage issues. As can be seen, after 1985,
corporate and noncorporate issues move largely in tandem, with corporate issues
being about two-thirds of noncorporate. The only exception is 1991–1994, where
issues are negative for both sectors, but more, rather than less, negative for
corporations. Prior to 1985, corporate issues were modest and basically
uncorrelated with noncorporate issues.
For corporate business, in the post–1985 period, the ratio of net commercial
mortgage issues to the sum of these and bond issues ranged between 8% and 20%
with the exception of the anomalous 1991–1994 period. Here commercial
mortgages were liquidated at a rapid rate, while bond issues continued at the same
rate as in the previous two years. For noncorporate businesses, commercial
mortgage issues averaged 40% of total CMI issues over the quarter century. The
ratio ranges from 20% to 74% over the sub-periods, with commercial issues being
particularly heavy during the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. The largest ratio, however, is
during the 1991–1994 period when commercial mortgages were liquidated at a
relatively greater rate than other debt.
It appears that the sharp liquidation of commercial mortgages in the early 1990s
was not driven solely by general factors affecting business total issues. Whereas
commercial mortgage net issues of noncorporate business were generally about
two-thirds of other CMI issues during the periods of positive issuance, three times
as much commercial mortgage debt as other debt was repaid during the early
1990s. And corporations sharply liquidated commercial mortgages while
continuing to grow their bond debt. Much of the collapse in commercial mortgage
issues, then, must have been due to changes in the supply of funds to this market.
This analysis is consistent with the sharp increase in the commercial mortgage-
Treasury rate spread during the early 1990s.
Exhibit 6 provides data on REIT sources and uses of funds. Here the 1989–1992
period is taken as the base low level of activity to show how REIT behavior has
evolved. As can be seen, the annual ﬁxed investment of REITs jumped in the
1993–1996 period, triggered by creation of the umbrella partnership UPREIT
structure. Annual investment then quadrupled in 1997–98, before settling back to
half of the 1993–1996 period activity. At the bottom of the table are listed the
ratio of commercial mortgage issues, other debt issues and equity funds raised
(internally and externally) to the total sources of funds. As can be seen,Commercial Real Estate Investment  429
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Exhibit 6  Sources and Uses of REIT Funds
1989–1992 1993–1994 1995–1996 1997–1998 1999–2002
FixedInvestment 2.4 14.1 15.9 69.8 6.7
NetAcqFinAssets 0.1 0.2 4.0 8.5 5.7
MiscAssets-MiscLiab 0.0 0.2 2.3 3.4 1.8
Disc 2.8 10.1 6.6 10.7 8.8
SavingsEquity Issues 3.8 14.9 14.0 33.7 7.2
ComMort 0.3 4.5 4.4 13.3 2.9
OtherCMISecRPs 1.0 4.9 5.8 38.6 9.2
Total Funds 5.1 24.2 24.2 85.5 19.3
SavingsEquity/TotalFunds 0.74 0.61 0.58 0.39 0.37
ComMort/TotalFunds 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15
OtherCMISecRPs/TotalFunds 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.45 0.48
Note: Annual ﬂows in billions of dollars from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts. The
speciﬁc series underlying the stated sources and uses are described in the Appendix. Also listed
are the ratios of the three uses of funds (savings plus equity issues, commercial mortgages, and
net issues of credit market instruments other than commercial mortgages plus security repurchases)
to total funds raised.
commercial mortgage issues constituted a roughly 15% to 20% share of REIT
fund sources, although the averaging in the table disguises signiﬁcant annual
variation. Equity funds, in contrast, declined from roughly 60% of sources during
the 1993–1996 period to 40% since then.
Purchases
As noted earlier, nonbank savings institutions (SAVs) were the ﬁrst to pull out of
the commercial mortgage market. By the early 1980s, many of the thrifts were
bankrupt owing to the combination of their having borrowed short term and lent
long (federally-chartered thrifts were barred from making adjustable rate loans)
and a signiﬁcant increase in the level of interest rates. The Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 encouraged thrifts to grow out of their
problem. The former sharply raised deposit insurance limits (from $40,000 to
$100,000) and phased out the Regulation Q ceiling rate on time and savings
deposits (Barth, Benston and Wiest, 1990). Both acts expanded asset powers of
federally-chartered thrifts, hopefully leading them to earn large positive margins
on the newly invested funds. Further, many states (e.g., California and Texas)
went well beyond the federal deregulation (Carron, 1988).
And grow thrifts did, raising $122 billion in funds annually during the 1983–1988

























Exhibit 7  Sources and Uses of Savings Institution Funds
1977–1979 1980–1982 1983–1985 1986–1988 1989–1990 1991–1994 1995–1996 1997–1998 1999–2002
Commercial Mortgages 3.9 2.8 16.1 5.2 16.1 13.8 0.6 0.1 7.1
U.S. Treasuries 0.7 1.6 6.0 0.9 4.5 0.3 4.9 3.6 0.2
Other CMI 61.4 28.2 91.4 96.8 112.1 50.1 11.6 19.2 43.7
Other FinAssets 6.6 19.8 21.0 8.8 6.0 15.6 2.3 10.5 16.8
Total Funds 71.2 52.3 134.4 111.7 126.6 79.2 8.5 26.2 67.3
Deposits 52.4 41.5 97.9 51.6 71.2 79.1 6.1 14.1 36.9
SecRPs  Other CMI 12.4 10.0 20.7 45.3 53.7 6.4 13.6 39.8 18.8
OtherLiab  Sav  Inv  Disc 6.3 0.9 15.7 14.8 1.7 6.3 1.0 0.6 11.7
ComMort/TotalFunds 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.11
Notes: Annual ﬂows in billions of dollars from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts. The speciﬁc series underlying the stated sources and uses are
described in the Appendix. Also listed is the ratio of net commercial mortgage issues to total funds raised.Commercial Real Estate Investment  431
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power in the Garn-St. Germain Act was the ability to invest in commercial
mortgages, and this triggered a surge in purchases of commercial mortgages—
$16 billion annually during the 1983–1985 period, quadruple the rate during the
previous six years. However, given the increased supply of securities to fund tax-
induced commercial real estate investment, these expanded purchases did not
lower the commercial mortgage–Treasury rate spread. That is, the increased
supply of funds was simply a response to a greater demand for funds.7
Unfortunately, overbuilding of commercial real estate occurred in response to both
the tax sheltered syndicates stimulated by the 1981 Tax Act and the lending of
bankrupt thrifts.8 This led to increases in vacancy rates and declines in rents and
values, especially in the Southwest, and negative margins on much of the thrifts’
new business. Congress then enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Regulatory
and Enforcement Act of 1989, which partially reversed the expansion in asset
powers, sharply raised capital requirements, tightened limits on holdings of
commercial real estate loans and extended regulation of federally-chartered thrifts
to state-chartered institutions (Barth, Benston and Wiest, 1990). The end result
was the closing of many thrifts. In 1989–1990, this sector lost funds at a $127
billion annual rate, and it lost another $80 billion annually during the 1991–1994
period.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 completed
the restructuring of the industry by introducing risk-based capital requirements on
whole real estate loans including commercial mortgages of savings institutions
and commercial banks. As a result of this introduction and liquidation of these
thrifts, thrift sector holdings of net sales of commercial mortgages fell by nearly
$15 billion annually during the 1989–1994 period.
Commercial bank aggregate annual sources and uses statements are shown in
Exhibit 8 for sub-periods that are close to those used in Exhibits 3 and 5. Slight
changes have been made to make the sub-periods correspond more closely to the
periods of faster or slower growth in the bank sector. More speciﬁcally, 1984–
1986 was the period of most rapid annual asset accumulation until 1995 and was
funded by the largest increase in small deposits until 1997. The post–1994 jump
in asset accumulation was funded by record net security (including large time
deposits) issues.
From the late 1970s until the late 1980s, the share of commercial bank net asset
accumulation directed to net commercial mortgage purchases increased fairly
steadily, rising from 8% to 24%. During the 1991–1994 period, the increased risk-
based reserve requirements (and reduced real estate development) lowered net
purchases to zero. During the last six years, net purchases have been 16% of net
asset accumulation and, given the large accumulation, have averaged $51 billion
per year. Note also the large purchases of bonds, 40% of which have been
corporates. A signiﬁcant fraction of these may have consisted of CMBS tranches.
Counting both direct and indirect CMBS derivative purchases, commercial bank
supply of funds to the commercial mortgage market may be back to its 1984–

























Exhibit 8  Commercial Banking
1977–1979 1980–1983 1984–1986 1987–1990 1991–1994 1995–1996 1997–2002
Gross Saving 8 12 20 24 31 30 48
Fixed Nonresidential Investment 7 14 16 20 19 18 26
Portfolio Uses
Commercial mortgages 9 12 34 34 11 85 1
Bonds 12 36 44 26 64 22 110
Other loans 92 64 117 90 72 189 174
Total portfolio 113 112 194 150 135 229 335
Fund Sources
Deposits (small time and checking) 50 91 136 85 60 78 175
Securities (including large time) 56 50 49 34 15 133 200
OtherLiab  OtherAssets 6 27 6 27 47 5 61
Checksum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ComMort/Total 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.00 0.08 0.16
Bonds/Total 0.11 0.32 0.22 0.18 0.55 0.09 0.35
Other/Total 0.82 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.45 0.82 0.48
Note: Annual ﬂows in billions of dollars from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts. The speciﬁc series underlying the stated sources and uses are
described in the Appendix. Also listed are the ratios of the three uses of funds (commercial mortgages, bonds and other loans) to total funds raised.Commercial Real Estate Investment  433
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Exhibit 9 plots the annual share of LICs net funds invested in commercial mortgages, other credit market instruments
(CMIs), and corporate equities (including mutual funds). The data are drawn from the Federal Reserve Flow of
Funds Accounts and the data aggregation methodology is explained in the Appendix.
Life insurance companies (LICs) also moved sharply out of commercial mortgages
during this period. Exhibit 9 plots the share of net funds raised by LICs that were
allocated to commercial mortgages, other credit market instruments (CMIs) and
corporate equities (including mutual funds).
During the 1977–1989 period, the allocation was roughly 20% to commercial
mortgages, 5% to corporate equities and 75% to other CMIs. The commercial
mortgage share dropped off in 1990 and then was negative until 1998, averaging
11% of total net funds raised over the 1992–1994 period, as LICs shifted into
corporate equities. The latter shift continued through 2000; during the 1998–2000
period, LICs put nearly 60% of their net funds into equities, backing off to 25%
in 2001–2002 when the stock market collapsed.
LICs are regulated by states rather than a federal entity. To assist in this process,
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), an association of
the chief insurance regulators of each state, has been established. States have long
delegated to the NAIC the responsibility for establishing ﬁnancial reporting
requirements and developing ‘‘model’’ laws and regulations, models that states
generally adopt (Fenn, 2001). The NAIC adopted risk-based capital requirements
in December 1992 to take effect at the beginning of 1994. Not only did this action
occur long after the LIC liquidation of commercial mortgage holdings began, but
relatively few LICs were constrained by the new requirements (Fenn, 2001).

























Exhibit 10  Asset Purchases by Asset-Backed Securizers
1986–1988 1989–1991 1992–1994 1995–1996 1997–1999 2000–2002
Agency Securities 32 5 5 14 28 38
Residential Mortgages 4 21 37 28 75 87
Commercial Mortgages 2 3 8 8 35 36
Other Loans 1 32 25 93 108 97
NetAcqFinAssets 39 52 75 143 245 258
Agency/NetAcqFinAssets 0.82 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.15
ResMort/NetAcqFinAssets 0.10 0.41 0.50 0.20 0.31 0.34
ComMort/NetAcqFinAssets 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.14
Other/NetAcqFinAssets 0.04 0.63 0.33 0.65 0.44 0.37
Note: Annual ﬂows in billions of dollars from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts. The speciﬁc series underlying the stated and uses of funds are
described in the Appendix. Also listed are the ratios of the four uses (agency securities, residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, and other loans) to
total funds raised.Commercial Real Estate Investment  435
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Fenn (2001:382-84) argues that events indicating major asset-quality problems in
the industry in 1990–1991 led companies to fear a negative response of
policyholders to companies with large holdings of junk bonds and commercial
mortgages. To illustrate the problems, Travelers, the seventh largest LIC, reserved
$650 million for anticipated losses in its commercial real estate portfolio in
October 1990 and the industry’s largest failure ever, Mutual Beneﬁt, which had
invested heavily in commercial real estate occurred in 1991. Reducing exposure
to such losses protected LICs from declines in both market share and share prices.
During 1992–1993 alone, banks and life insurance companies liquidated $50
billion of commercial mortgage holdings. In spite of a record $85 billion
repayment of business commercial mortgage debt in these two years, the spread
between commercial mortgages and ten-year Treasuries averaged 233 basis points,
a full 100 basis points greater than during 1987–1990.11 Clearly, supply restraints
were affecting the market in 1992–1993.
Issuers of asset-backed securities are special purpose vehicles (SPVs), entities
established by contractual arrangement to hold assets and to issue debt obligations
backed by the assets. The SPVs are similar to federally-related mortgage pools in
that they are not actual institutions but are created for bookkeeping purposes. The
ﬁnancial assets of the sector are federally-related mortgages pool securities,
mortgages, and other loans (autos and the like). These ‘‘securitized assets’’ have
been transferred from the balance sheets of the sectors that originated the loans
to the balance sheets of the SPVs. The obligations issued by the SPVs (e.g., CMBS
tranches) are classiﬁed as corporate bonds as well as commercial paper and
represent claims against the assets that have been pooled as collateral.
Exhibit 10 reports the asset ﬂows into these SPVs over the last seventeen years
broken down into agency securities (agency mortgage pools), residential
mortgages, commercial mortgages and other loans. The ﬁrst assets securitized
were the mortgage pools in 1986–1988. This level of activity was not matched
again until the late 1990s. Total securitized assets nearly doubled from $75 billion
in 1992–1994 to $143 billion in 1995–1996 and doubled again by 2001–2002.
Net commercial mortgage purchases did not reach $10 billion until 1996 and then
quickly accelerated to the $30–$50 billion dollar range in 1998–2002 as the
CMBS market exploded. By then, 14% of securitized assets were commercial
mortgages.
 Conclusion
The Federal Reserve’s ﬂow of funds accounts is a marvelous ‘‘closed loop’’ system
with incredible detail on ﬁnancial ﬂows. For each sector, total sources and uses
of funds are equal (up to a discrepancy item), and for each market, issues and
purchases of the security are equal. Thus all investment is ﬁnanced and all
securities issued are purchased.12 This data is used to better understand changes
in the commercial mortgage market over the last quarter century and how these436  Donohue and Hendershott
changes may have affected commercial real estate investment. These data are
supplemented by the spread between commercial mortgage and Treasury yields.
This study has analyzed commercial mortgage sectoral issues and purchases to
determine if there were periods where unusual sectoral purchases seemed to
generate unusual sectoral issues (i.e., where purchases were driving issues rather
than the other way around). Two periods were noted. The ﬁrst period is when
thrifts were encouraged to grow out of their negative-net-worth problem in the
early 1980s and were given authority to invest in commercial mortgages. During
1983–1985, savings institutions added to commercial mortgage holdings at the
annual rate of $16 billion versus a modest $4 billion a year during the previous
six years. However, the fact that the commercial mortgage–Treasury interest rate
spread did not decline suggests that these purchases were simply a response to
greater than normal net issues by noncorporate businesses, rather than a trigger
for them.
The second period is 1991–1994, when higher risk-based capital requirements
were imposed on commercial mortgage holdings of banks and life insurance
company losses on junk bonds and commercial mortgages induced them to shift
out of risky corporate and commercial real estate debt. Seemingly in response,
noncorporate businesses paid down commercial mortgage debt at a faster rate than
other debt, in spite of the fact that the latter had grown much faster the former in
earlier years, and nonﬁnancial corporations liquidated substantial commercial
mortgage debt while continued to issue corporate bonds at the rate of earlier years.
Here, the shrinkage in credit supply—the liquidation of holdings by commercial
banks and life insurance companies—seemed to have a direct impact on
commercial mortgage issues (and possibly on commercial real estate investment).
Future research might quantify the unusual business commercial mortgage
issuance behavior econometrically, using seemingly unrelated regression analysis.
Presumably issuance would be well above predicted in the early 1980s and below
during the early 1990s. Research could also usefully be directed at the direction
of causation between sectoral commercial mortgage purchases and issues, the key
questions being when were speciﬁc ﬁnancial institution purchases driving business
issues and when issues were driving purchases. Perhaps a vector autoregression
analysis, such as that recently used by Ling and Naranjo (2003) to determine
whether REIT capital ﬂows were causing equity REIT returns or vice versa, could
be undertaken.
Alternatively, an analysis of the relationship between commercial mortgage issues
and commercial construction itself is a possibility, where the key would be to
determine when issues were driving construction rather than the reverse. These
analyses could also be used to determine the effect of recent developments in the
market, such as greater REIT issues and the securitization of commercial
mortgages into CMBSs. Finally, other factors that drive construction should be
included in these analyses. For example, general macro economic shocks as well
as tax law changes are certainly relevant to real estate construction.Commercial Real Estate Investment  437
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 Appendix
  Aggregating Flow of Funds Sectoral Sources and Uses of
Funds
This is a short description of how sector sources and uses were aggregated or
combined. First a brief aggregate identity is given, followed by a breakdown of
the aggregates and ﬁnally a reaggregate up.
Noncorporate
The basic identity can be written as:
CapCons (or gross inv or gross saving)  CapExp  NetAcqFinAssets 
NetIncreaseLiab
These are divided into the following components:
Net IncreaseinLiab  ComMort  OtherCMI  PropNetInv  TradePay 
MiscLiab  TaxesPay
NetAcqFinAssets  MiscAssets  TradeRec  OtherFinAssets
Substituting and rearranging:
ComMort  OtherCMI  PropNetInv  CapExp  GrossSaving  (TradeRed
 TradePay)  (MiscAssets  MiscLiab)  (OtherAssets  TaxPay)
Corporate Nonfinancial
The basic identity can be written as:
InterFunds  IVA  CapExp  NetAcqFinAssets  NetIncreaseinLiab  Disc
These are then divided into the following components:
NetIncreaseinLiab  ComMort  CorBonds  OtherCMI  NetEquIssues 
TradePay  TaxPay  MiscLiab
NetAcqFinAsset  TradeRec  MiscAssets  OtherAssets
Substituting and rearranging:
ComMort  CorBonds  OtherCMI  NetEquIssues  CapExp  InterFunds 
IVA  (TradeRec  TradePay)  (MiscAsset  MiscLiab  Disc) 
(OtherAssets  TaxesPay)438  Donohue and Hendershott
REITs
The basic identity is:
FixedInv  NetAcqFinAssetsexceptMisc  (MiscAssets  MiscLiab)  Disc 
(Saving  EquityIssues)  ComMort  (otherCMI  SecRPs)
Life Insurance Companies
The basic identity is:
Inv  GrossSaving  NetAcqFinAssets  Disc  NetIncLiab
where:
NetAcqFinAssets  ComMort  OtherCMI  (CorEqu  MF)  Cash 
MiscAssets
Rearranging:
ComMort  OtherCMI  (CorEqu  MF)  GrossSaving  Inv  NetIncLiab
 Cash  MiscAssets
Savings Institutions
The basic identity can be written as:
NetAcqFinAssets  NetIncLiab  (Sav  Inv)  Disc
These are divided into the following components:
NetAcqFinAsset  ComMort  USTreasuries  OtherCMI  OtherFinAssets
NetIncreaseinLiab  Deposits  (SecRPs  CMI)  OtherLiab
Substituting and rearranging:
ComMort  USTreasuries  OtherCMI  OtherFinAssets  Deposits  (SecRPs
 CMI)  (OtherLiab  Sav  Inv  Disc).
Asset-Backed Security Issuers
NetAcqFinAssets  AgencySec  ComMort  ResMort  OtherLoans
where:
NetAcqFinAssets  NetIncLiab  Saving  FixedInv  DiscCommercial Real Estate Investment  439
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Commercial Banks
Three asset items, two liability items and a catchall net everything else are created.
The asset and liability items are as deﬁned; the catchall is the rest.
‘‘Portfolio’’  ComMort  OtherTotalLoans  ‘‘Bonds’’(US  Munis 
Cort&Foreign)
‘‘Funds’’  ‘‘Deposits’’(Checking  Smalltime  ‘‘Securities’’(LargeTime 
FedFunds  CMI)
OtherLiab  OtherAssets (Catchall)
 Endnotes
1 It is worth noting that net investment and saving ﬂows are recorded. That is, if some
households dissave while others save, it is the difference between the two that appears
in the accounts. Similarly, if some corporations decide to purchase buildings from, say,
pension investors, and stop leasing space, this appears as corporate structures investment
(and pension disinvestment).
2 The accounts record net, not gross, issues and purchases. Thus, if some corporations
issue commercial mortgages, while others retire an equal amount, no issues will be
recorded for the sector.
3 LIC commercial mortgage holdings decreased by 25% between the end of 1990 and the
end of 1996.
4 Quarterly mortgage contract rates are averaged to get annual values and are then
converted to bond equivalents. Some variation in the spread is expected because the
quality of the underlying mortgages (loan-to-value ratio, debt-coverage ratio, etc.) varies
over time. Also, the market’s assessment of expected credit losses for a given quality
mortgage may vary.
5 Proprietor’s net investment is computed as the residual to make total sources of
noncorporate business funds equal to total uses.
6 For a lucid discussion of changes in corporate sector ﬁnances, especially the enormous
retirement of equity in the 1995–2000 period, see Teplin (2001).
7 While Giliberto (1992) found a positive correlation between mortgage supply and
construction, it is not clear that causation was running from supply to construction rather
than vice versa. In fact, the failure of the interest rate spread to rise suggests the causation
was from construction to supply.
8 In Exhibit 5, the especially sharp 110% increase in noncorporate capital expenditures
between 1977–1979 and 1986–1988. In contrast, capital expenditures of corporations
increased by only 75%.
9 Given that the reserve requirements on all CMBS tranches are the same and equal to
those on whole commercial loans, commercial banks likely do not hold the higher
quality tranches.
10 A reviewer has suggested an alternative explanation. According to the individual, when
the NIAC announced a review of LIC reserve requirements in 1990, it stated that440  Donohue and Hendershott
investments made after the announcement would be subject to the new requirements.
That is, tougher standards could apply to all new investments. This would obviously
deter gross investment in commercial mortgages and thus start the slide in LIC holdings.
11 The rise in the spread was accompanied by increased debt-coverage ratios on commercial
mortgages (Ambrose, Benjamin and Chinloy, 1996).
12 For an early use of these data and these market-clearing relationships to explain the
levels of three market interest rates, see Hendershott (1977).
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